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ARTICLES 
MEASURING PERFORMANCE OF INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE 
NETWORKS USING STOCHASTIC NETWORKS 
MICHAEL P. BAILEY 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
(Received August 1989; revisons received January, October 1991; accepted December 1991) 
A model reflecting the evolution of an engagement between an integrated air defense system (IADS) and a penetrating 
strike group is presented. The engagement is modeled as an optimization problem on a network with stochastic arc 
lengths. We produce the distribution of our measure of effectiveness, as well as calculating the importance of each IADS 
agent to the performance of the overall system. We demonstrate the effectiveness of several jamming plans against the 
network. 
Since World War II, interest has been growing steadily in techniques which exploit the electro-
magnetic spectrum to gather intelligence in the sup-
port of warfare. Consequently, methods have been 
developed for preventing radars from being effective: 
electronic countermeasures (ECM). Aircraft and 
ground systems capable of using ECM techniques to 
jam air defense radar allow air strikes to be performed 
with greater safety to the attacking force. 
A longstanding problem faced by those employing 
ECM is the evaluation of the degradation in the per-
formance of the air defense system caused by jam-
ming. In this paper, we propose to measure this 
performance as the time elapsed between the time a 
strike group enters a defended area and the time the 
air defense system fires upon the strike group. This 
time is the convolution of detection, data fusion, and 
decision task times. 
Each of these task times is assumed to be a random 
variable. Furthermore, in the dense radar environ-
ment observable throughout most of the world, there 
are several emitters searching each cubic meter of 
airspace. These emitters are linked in a hierarchical 
communications network so they may share infor-
mation and so command and control may be per-
formed. Thus, the time required for an unalerted air 
defense network to prepare to fire a weapon can be 
seen to be the solution to a stochastic network opti-
mization problem. 
We will call our network model the relaxed Petri 
model. Special cases of this model include Petri nets, 
shortest paths, and PERT network models. In fact, 
the relationship of PERT networks, Petri nets, and 
relaxed Petri nets is hierarchical in terms of generality, 
with the hierarchical order given as listed. Kulkarni 
(1984), Kulkarni and Adlakha (1984), and Haas and 
Shedler (1988), respectively, study these network 
models when the arc lengths or task times are allowed 
to be random variables. The network of Levis ( 1986) 
was the first where any type of military data or com-
mand network was modeled using Petri nets, though 
this effort was limited to deterministic task times. This 
work was expanded by Remy (1986). 
1. BACKGROUND 
Most jammer planning by current tactical aircraft is 
done on a target-by-target basis. The director of an air 
strike is presented with a map which indicates the 
location and signal characteristics of each known air 
defense emitter near the strike target. The decision is 
made to jam a subset of the emitters in a prespecified 
sequence to increase the survivability of the air strike. 
This decision is constrained by the availability of 
jamming assets carried by the jamming aircraft. An 
emitter may be jammed only if the aircraft is carrying 
the jamming pod designed to match the emitter's 
signal characteristics. Furthermore, the pod must be 
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aimed at the target emitter to be effective. The aircraft 
is configurable to meet specific mission needs, but it 
can only carry a limited number of jamming pods. 
The ECM targets in an air defense force are classi-
fied functionally as early warning, height finding, tar-
get acquisition, and target tracking. Several of each 
type of emitter are tied together with several non-
emitting data fusion nodes and one or more command 
posts in a hierarchical network. When attacked, this 
network progresses through a series of engagement 
states, progressing from unalerted to higher states of 
engagement and threat awareness. The behavior of 
the IADS is described as the engagement takes place 
in Heilenday (1988). The description found there 
forms the basis for our model. 
Consider the tactical situation diagrams in 
Figures 1-4. Each small circle represents emitter 
locations, while the attached larger circles are range 
rings. The heavy line represents a flight path of a strike 
group passing through this area. Also pictured are a 
data fusion center, an early warning (EW) report 
center, a zone command center, and two battalion 
command posts. At a data fusion node, data supplied 
by one or more early warning emitters are processed, 
the result being transmitted to height finding emitters 
in the area, and to the zone command node. At a 
zone command node, decisions are made about 
whether the air defense network will attack a target, 
0--
-
and issue commands to that effect. For any weapon 
to be launched, the associated target tracking radar 
must be locked onto the target and the required com-
mand to fire must have been received from the zone 
command node. 
In Figure 5, we show the evolution of an air defense 
system's state as it engages an intruder. The system 
starts the engagement when one of its EW emitters 
detects a possible threat. It transmits this information 
to the EW report center, which processes the detection 
data and issues a broadcast which is received by all 
target acquisition emitters, the data fusion node, and 
the zone command node. 
The target acquisition emitters attempt to develop 
a two-dimensional solution of the incoming aircraft. 
They share their tracking data with a central target 
acquisition data fusion node. Height finding (HF) 
emitters are designed to determine the incoming 
aircraft's height. These emitters must have the 
two-dimensional target acquisition solution to search 
effectively for the intruder. Target trackers use the 
three-dimensional track to develop a solution of suf-
ficient accuracy to guide a missile. 
The zone command node is tasked with monitoring 
the communications between the emitters, and deter-
mining the nature of the threat. The zone command 
center decides if the aircraft should be fired upon, and 
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Figure 1. Early warning system . 
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Figure 2. Battalion level target acquisition radars. 
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Figure 3. Battery level target acquisition radars. 
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Figure 4. Target tracker radars. 
battalion command center receives directives from the 
zone command center, and tasks its assets to engage 
the target. In particular, no target tracker can attempt 
to detect the intruder unless clearance is given by the 
battalion commander. This is because emissions from 
a target tracker are considered an act of aggression. 
The strike group is subject to missile or gunfire when-
ever a target tracking radar is locked onto the strike 
group and the battery to which it belongs has been 
given instructions to engage. 
Radar jamming techniques vary in their sophisti-
cation and effect. Based on intelligence gathered about 
the signal characteristics and signal processing of an 
emitter, as well as the function, designs ofECM equip-
ment are more or less capable of causing combinations 
of the following effects in radars, communications 
channels, and data links: 
1. slow the detection or transmission task; 
2. reduce detection range; 
3. prevent a node from receiving transmissions from 
another node; 
4. force two or more emitters to detect the aircraft 
simultaneously before a track can be established. 
Planners of ECM employment use some simple 
rules of thumb to choose jamming targets and to 
choose the effect they wish to have on the targeted 
emitter or link. We will show that, through stochastic 
network analysis, we can produce performance mea-
sures for various trial jamming plans. Furthermore, 
we can index each emitter's performance in terms of 
its contribution to the functioning of the overall sys-
tem. Formally, if Tis the (stochastic) performance 
measure of interest, we will give an algorithm for 
computing E[ o T / o V(x )], where xis a network activity 
and V(x) is its (randomly) duration. 
The mission of the IADS is to maintain control of 
the airspace surrounding some high valued target, like 
the airstrip shown in Figures 1-4. The mission of the 
strike group is to penetrate this airspace and destroy 
Figure 5. Evolution of an air defense engagement. 
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the target airstrip. In this work, we will take the 
perspective of the attacking strike group and the plan-
ners of the strike group's ECM. 
Our goal as ECM planners is to control the evolu-
tion of the IADS's engagement state, preventing the 
IADS from firing guns and missiles at the strike group. 
Thus, we will use as our measure of effectiveness the 
cumulative time that the strike group is subjected to 
possible missile or gunfire. We will attempt to drive 
this tracking time to zero by adroitly applying our 
ECM capabilities. Note that the time of lethal expo-
sure is one among a number of appropriate measures 
available. The development of the stochastic relaxed 
Petri net model is not limited to this measure. 
We will construct a model that includes a network 
with random arc lengths to calculate measures of 
IADS performance. This model will not include: 
• the effects of penetrator turns; 
• autonomous defensive actions; 
• airborne interceptor actions; 
• damage to the IADS during the engagement; 
• the effects of several penetrator axes. 
The model we develop here concerns the flow of data 
and commands through the IADS, as well as providing 
guidance for the employment of ECM. 
2. THE DETERMINISTIC NETWORK 
In this section, we construct a class of networks called 
relaxed Petri nets. These networks consist of a directed 
graph along with some special arc and node designa-
tions designed to capture the command structure and 
data handling mechanisms of an air defense network. 
It has been observed that this structure is appropriate 
for modeling in applications as diverse as performance 
evaluation of multiprocessor computer systems to 
analysis of the propagation of information in a hier-
archical organization. 
Let G = (N, A) be a network constructed so that 
each arc x E A represents some activity of the IADS. 
Thus, A will consist of arcs representing emitter detec-
tions, decision processes, communications, etc. Let 
v: A - R + be a nonnegative weight function giving 
the duration of each activity. 
The arc set A is partitioned into two subsets, a set 
of essential activities E and a set of nonessential 
activities E' = A - E. An essential activity x E E has 
the property that no activity y E A with tail(y) = 
head(x) may commence until activity xis completed. 
In the PERT fomulation, every activity is essential. 
For each n E N, the set of essential (nonessential) 
activities pointing into n is denoted En (E~). 
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Among the activities E;, we require that kn of these 
activities must terminate before any y with tail(y) = 
n may commence. We insist that kn = 0 or kn < 
indegree(n) - I En I. To summarize, an activity y EA 
with tail(y) = n may commence if and only if: 
all activities in En are complete; (1) 
kn members of E; are complete. (2) 
These networks are similar to Petri nets, where the 
places are the nodes, the transitions are the arcs, and 
the tokens correspond to the assembly of the track 
and command data. However, our analysis of these 
structures will focus on their transient response to a 
threat, rather than their steady-state behavior. 
Example 1. Consider the network fragments shown 
in Figures 6 and 7. There are several conventions for 
relaxed Petri net diagramming: 
1. arcs with stars at their tails represent activities 
which start at time 0.0; 
2. arcs whose tails are small, unlabeled circles repre-
sent communications activities; 
3. thick circles indicate emitters, while thin circles 
indicate nonemitting nodes like command posts 
and data processing centers; 
4. dashed arcs represent activities which take zero 
time units to complete. 
For instance, the arc pointing into EW 1 in Figure 












Figure 6. Partial relaxed Petri net, early warning and 
command portion. 
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Figure 7. Partial relaxed Petri net, command post 2 
and battery 3. 
beginning of the scenario and the entry of the air-
craft into the detection envelope of early warning 
emitter 1. Continuing, the arc from EW 1 to HF EW 
1 is the EW detection activity, the arc pointing from 
HF EW 1 to the small, unlabeled circle represents the 
EW emitter's height finding activity. The arc from the 
small, unlabeled circle to the EW report center repre-
sents the communication of the EW data to the report 
center. 
The report center processes the data (represented by 
the arc pointing out of EW RPT CTR), and then 
broadcasts these data to the early warning data fusion 
(EW DF) node, and to the two command post level 
target acquisition emitters labeled CP TA 1 ( command 
post target acquisition 1) and CP TA 2. This broadcast 
takes some time, with the data arriving at each of the 
recipients at the same time. This is faithfully repre-
sented by the arc joining the two unlabeled nodes, and 
the three dashed arcs pointing to each of the recipient 
nodes. 
Consider the battalion 3 height finder (BA T3 HF) 
node in Figure 7. It has three arcs pointing into it: 
1. the activity that starts at time 0.0 corresponding 
to the aircraft traversing the airspace between the 
beginning of the scenario and the maximum detec-
tion range of this emitter; 
11. the arc that comes from the target acquisition data 
fusion (TA DF) node representing the TA DF's 
communicating TA data from a TA node to this 
node; 
iii. the dashed arc that represents the communication 
of data from BA T3 TA to BA T3 HF, which takes 
no time because the TA and HF functions are 
housed in the same radar system. 
The BA T3 HF emitter needs two conditions to be 
satisfied before its detection task commences. It needs 
the aircraft to be within its detection envelope, and it 
needs the two-dimensional track of the aircraft, which 
is provided by some target acquisition emitter. Thus, 
arc i is essential, while one of arcs ii and iii must also 
be completed. Thus, EBAT3HF = {arc i}, E~AT3HF = 
{arc ii, arc iii!, and kBAn HF= 1. 
2.1. Measuring Performance of K-Trigger 
Networks 
Let {s, t I c N, s-# t be network source and sink nodes, 
respectively. We wish to find the time T(u ), which is 
the maximum of the time that the last member of E1 
completes and the time that the k1 th activity in E; 
completes, where u is the aforementioned weight func-
tion. This corresponds to the time at which node t has 
all the input it requires. For instance, let node t 
represent the issue of firing orders by the command 
post, T( u) be the time at which all required data are 
available and (if necessary) permission is granted to 
fire by higher authorities. To find T(v) we adapt the 
well known forward sweep algorithm from PERT 
analysis. 
Our algorithm for calculating T(u ), which we call 
algorithm G, utilizes some simple notation. States of 
the algorithm are given by strings (ordered sets) of 
elementsinA. If Xn = x 1x 2 ••• Xn is a string of elements 
in A, Xm = X1X2 .•. Xm, 0 .,;; m .,;; n is called a prefix 
of X,,; this is denoted Xm -x,,. The symbols C, E, ti:, 
n and u will be applied to strings, sets, and combi-
nations thereof, but will always mean the usual oper-
ation applied to the underlying sets of the strings. The 
activity y appended to Xn, X1X2 ... x,,y, is denoted 
Xn · y. 
Algorithm G 
Initialize: Yo = 0, a(Y 0 ) = Ix EA: tail(x) = sl, To= 
0, n = 0, r(x) = u(x) for all x EA 
While a(Y,,)-# 0 
n = n + 1 
Y,, = Yn-1 • Yn 
T,, = Tn-1 + r(y,,) 
r(x) = r(x) - r(y 11) for all XE a(Y,,-1) 
~=~·=···=···=·--·=···«"-··-""' »» • ... .,., ... ·"······· .................... · ··············································•·······-----···········•.ww.w . .................................. m •.•·································•mc-5pVil§fll'©·'200--r--- "R~lTI§'.R§'§ e)'fved 
if Ehead(vn) C Yn and I Ehead(.>nl' n Yn I = khead(IYnl, then 
a(Yn) = a(Yn-i) - Ix EA: head(x) = head(yn)l U 
Ix EA: tail(x) = head(yn)l 
a(Yn) = a(Yn) - Ix EA: there exists y E Yn with 
head(x) = tail(y)J 
endwhile. 
Denote the terminating values of Tn and Yn by T(v) 
and Yc(v ), respectively. Let v+ be the set of non-
negative weight functions on A, v+ = {v: A - R+). 
Let {J be the set of strings which may terminate algo-
rithm G for weight functions in V+, {J = I Y G( v ): 
v E v+J, and let r be a set containing /3 and all prefixes 
of elements of {J. We will call the sequence Yo, Yi, 
... , Yn = YG(v) the sample path of algorithm G for 
the weight function u. Thus, every possible sample 
path of algorithm G is contained in r, Algorithm G 
gets its name from the fact that it is a greedy algorithm 
on the state-space r, where the objective function value 
of each element of t is the length of the longest s-
rooted directed path. This observation is presented 
formally in Bailey ( 1992). 
2.2. Structural Properties of the State Space 
We now establish several structural properties of the 
state-space f. These properties become essential when 
we consider stochastic relaxed Petri nets. Note that 
each property holds for all nonnegative weight func-
tions v E v+, so they will hold with probability 1 
when l V(x): x E Al is a set of nonnegative random 
task durations. Let YE r, Letj(y) = min{i: y E a(Y,)j 
for each y E a(Y). Let v E v+ and suppose that 
YG(v) = Y1Y2 ... Ym, and T(v) are computed. Let the 
set P( v) be constructed as 
Ym E P(v), 
for every y E P(v ), Y1<y) E P(v ). 
Lemma 1. P( v) is a directed (s, t) path. 
(3) 
(4) 
Proof. Let y = Yn• By definition ofj(y), the condition 
and 
is satisfied by appending Y1<yJ to ~<yJ-1. Furthermore, 
y E a(y 1<y)) implies head(Y;<yJ) = tail(y). 
By the same logic as given for Yn, we know that 
tail(y) = head(Y;(yJ) for each y E P(u) with j(y) > 0. 
This backward tracing of the path continues until 
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we have y1(y) E a(0) for some y E P(v ). Since a(0) = 
ly: tail(y) = sj, Y;<y) completes the directed (s, t) path. 
Lemma 2. T(u) = LyEP(v)v(y). 
Proof. Using the indexing of algorithm G, we will 
show that if Ym E P(v ), then 
Tm - ½<Ym) = V(Ym), 
Upon accessing Y1(Ym), Ym enters a(}'_,(Ym)) and 
r(YJcy) = u(yJ(Ym)), On stages 
}(Ym) + 1, }(Ym) + 2, ... , m - 1, r(ym) 
is decreased sequentially by amounts 
Note that because of the greediness of algorithm G, 
r(Ym) remains nonnegative. At stage m - 1, Ym is 
appended to Y m- i at cost 
= r(Ym) 
= v(ym)- [r(yj(ym)+I) + r(Y1(Ym)+2) + • • • + r(Ym-i)], 
and we have 
Tm - T;(ym) 
= r(Ym) + [r(Y;(Ym)+I) + T(Y1(Ym)+2) + · · · r(Ym-1)] 
= v(ym), 
Thus, the summed durations of arcs on the directed 
(s, t) path given by P(v) determines T(v). Following 
the terminology of PERT analysis, we call P( v) the 
critical path for the weight function v. It is obvious 
that oT(v )/ov(x) = 1 for x E P(v) and oT(v )/ov(x) = 
0 for x ft P( v ). Only those jamming assignments made 
against elements of P(v) affect T(v), jamming non-
critical arcs has no affect on the performance of the 
air defense system. 
3. STOCHASTIC RELAXED PETRI NETS 
Let I V(x ): x EA I be a set of independent nonnegative 
random activity durations. Let IX(t), t ;;;, O) be a 
stochastic process with state-space ~ and intertransi-
tion times r,, i = 0, 1, 2, .... Suppose that X(t) has 
these properties. 
Property 1 
P[X(0) = 0] = l and P[X(t) Er]= I fort;;.. 0. 
Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved 
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Property 2 
P[X(Tm+i) = Ym ·XI T1, T2, ... , Tm, X(Tm) = Ym] 
= P[V(x) - (T;(x)+l + T1(x)+2 + • • • Tm) = Tm+l 
and 
V(x) - (T;(x)+l + T1(x)+2 + ... +Tm) 
,s; V(x) - (T1(z)+l + TPj(z)+2 + . , . + Tm) 
for all Z E a(Ym) I T1, T2, .. ,, Tm, X(Tm) = Ym] 
for all Ym E f - f3 and all x E a(Ym). 
Property 3 
P[X(t) = Ym I X(tm) = Ym] = 1 
for all Yrn E f3 and all t ;a,, 0. 
Property 1 states that the process always starts in 
state 0, the unalerted state. Property 2 states that the 
transition from state Y m to Y m • x is governed by the 
physical requirements of the system, transition takes 
place only when activity x is complete and only if 
no other ongoing activity is not completed sooner. 
Property 3 provides conditions for absorption of 
the process in the engagement state of interest. 
The following results make explicit the relationship 
of the process {X(t), t ;a,, O} to sample paths of algo-
rithm G for realizations of V. Lemma 3 states that the 
probability that X(t) passes through the state Ym E f 
at or before time t is equal to the probability that Y m 
is a prefix of Ya(V) and that Tm, the accumulated 
time of constructing Y m, is less than or equal to t. 
Lemma 4 follows immediately, stating that the prob-
ability that X(t) is absorbed in YE f3 at or before time 
tis the probability that Y = Ya( V) and T( V) ,s; t. 
Lemma 3. Fort ;a,, 0 and Ym E f, 
P[X(t) = Y, Ym - Y] = P[Tm ,s; t, Ym - Ya(V)]. 
Proof. By construction of X(t). 
Lemma 4. Fort ;a,, 0 and Yrn E (3, 
P[X(t) = Ym] = P[Tm :s.; t, Y = Ya(V)]. 
Proof. Because Ym E (3, Ym is an absorbing state 
of X(t). Thus, this lemma follows directly from 
Lemma 4. 
Corollary 1. For YE (3, 
P[Ya(V) = Y] = lim1-"" P[X(t) = Y]. 
Corollary 2. For every t ;a,, 0, 
P[Ta(V) :s.; t] = P[X(t) E /3] = L P[X(t) = Y]. 
YE/1 
Corollary 1 uses the marginal of P[X(t) = Y] with 
respect tot to state that the probability that Ya(V) = 
Y is the probability that X(t) is absorbed in Y. 
Corollary 2 states that the distribution of T( V) is the 
distribution of the absorption time of X(t). 
3.1. Exponential Activity Durations 
Let l V(x ), x E A} be a set of independent, exponen-
tially distributed random variables, V(x) ~ exp(µ(x)). 
Exponential activity durations coincide with the as-
sumption that activities complete randomly at a con-
stant rate. For instance, the rate at which a target is 
acquired by a target tracking radar is constant over 
time, so long as the state of the network does not 
change. Modeling activity durations as exponentials 
has the attractive property that the rate at which a 
general task is completed, like establishing an EW 
track, is proportional to the number of EW emitters 
searching for the strike group. It is feasible to extend 
this model to the case where rates may vary over time, 
perhaps as a function of target range or emitter 
workload. 
Let us denote incremental time incurred by access-
ing x, T(x), after m iterations of algorithm Gas Trn(X). 
Recalling the definition ofj(x), note that T;<x>+1(x) =
V(x). 
Lemma 5. Let Yrn E f - (3, then for all x E a(Ym) 
P[Tm+1(X) ,s; t I T1, T2, ... , Tm, X(Tm) = Ym] 
= 1 - e-µ.(X)I. 
Furthermore, ITm+1(x): x E a(Ym)} is a set of mutually 
independent random variables. 
Proof. We will induct on m. Form= 0, the statement 
of the lemma reduces to 
P[T1(X) :s.; t] = P[V(x) ,s; t] = I - e-,,.(x>1• 
Now consider that the lemma holds for m = 0, 1, ... , 
k. Hence, !Tk+1(x): x E a(Yk)l is a set of mutually 
independent exponential random variables, Tk+1(x) ~ 
exp(µ(x)). Let 
z = arg min {Tk+1(x): 
xEa(Yk) 
······p,c-c·v·---··---······---··············v-n.--...w,·,··••wmcc••····, Cci"pyright ©2001 Alf Rig fits·Resehied"····  m..... · .................................................. . 
then by the strong memoryless property of exponential 
random variables, 
ITk+ix) = Tk+i(x) - Tk+1(z): x E a(Yk) 
() a(Yk+l) I T1, T2, ... , Tk, X(Tk) = Yk, z) 
is a set of mutually independent random variables, 
and 
Tk+i<x) = Tk+1(X) - Tk+1(z) ~ exp(µ(x)) 
for each x E a(Yk) n a(Yk+1). Each y E a(Yk+1) -
a(Yk) is an activity with tail(y) = head(z), thus 
j(y) = k + 1 and Tk+2(y) = V(y). Thus, 
ITk+iCx) = Tk+1(x) - Tk+1(z): 
x E a(Yk+1) I T1, T2, ... , Tk, ... , Tk, X(Tk) = Yk, z) 
is a set of independent exponentials, Tk+Ax) ~ 
exp(µ(x)) for each x E a(Yk+1). 
This lemma states that, given the history of the 
process X(t) until it reaches Ym E ~, the incremental 
time of appending x to Y m is exponentially distributed 
and independent of the other elements appendable to 
Y.n• Thus, the intertransition time of X(t) is the min-
imum of a set of independent exponentials. For each 
YE s, define µ(Y) as 
µ(Y) = L µ(y). 
y€a(Y) 
Define the matrix Q, 
{
µ(x) Y = X · X E s 
Qx,y = -µ(X) U =XE s 
0 otherwise 
and let A.z(t) = P[X(t) = Z I X(O) = Y]. 
Lemma 6. For each YE /3, 
P[T(V):::.: t, Yc(V) = Y] 
= P[X(t) = YI X(O) = 0] = P0,y(t). 
Proof. This is evident from Lemma 5 and the defini-
tion of algorithm G. 
Note that the generator matrix Q is uppertriangular, 
so that the Kolmogorov equation P'(t) = QP(t) may 
be solved sequentially, starting with the boundary 
conditions PY,Y(O) = 1 for all YE r, Px,Y(O) = 0 for 
X #: Y. Procedures that solve the Kolmogorov equa-
tion numerically include process uniformization; see 
Ross (1983). Because of the sparse uppertriangular 
structure of Q significant improvements in standard 
uniformization are achievable and were implemented 
to solve the examples presented here. 
Measuring Air Defense Networks / 655 
Corollary 3. Suppose that we aggregate all basic states 
into a single absorbing state called w, then 
P[X(t) = w] = P[T(V):::.: t]. 
Thus, we can calculate the distribution of the time 
until absorption using the modified process. This dis-
tribution is the distribution of the time until the first 
missile is launched or the first gun is fired. 
As stated in Lemmas 1 and 2, ifwe know Yc(v) for 
the deterministic weight function v, we can establish 
a critical path P(v), such that the partial derivative of 
T(v) is unity for arcs on the critical path and zero if 
not. In treating the randomly weighted network, we 
use the expected value of this partial derivative, 
Cx = E[oT(V)/oV(x)] 
= P[x is on the critical path for Yc(V)]. 
In Corollary 4, we establish this quantity and show 
how it may be computed. 
Corollary 4. For all x EA, 
Cx = P[Y = Yc(V)]. 
YE{3;x 1s cntical in Y 
Computation of criticality indices depends only on 
the embedded Markov chain of X(t ). Experience in 
real IADS problems has shown that these methods 
are insensitive to the assumption of exponentiality 
so long as the embedded Markov chain is correct. 
Because planners of ECM employment can expect a 
one-for-one return in the measure of effectiveness 
for delays in critical activities, the set of probabilities 
!Cx: x EA l serves as indications as to which activities 
should be attacked by jamming. This idea has some 
limitations because jamming assignment decisions are 
discrete, not continuous. However, as we shall see in 
the next section, critically indices provide new hope 
for the development of optimal jammer assignments. 
4. DELAYED K-TRIGGER NETWORKS 
The model presented thus far has an outstanding 
drawback: some of the activity durations should not 
be exponentially distributed in length, they should be 
deterministically known. These are, of course, those 
activities representing the penetration epoch for each 
detection envelope. For a known flight route, these 
times are known with relative certainty and should 
not be modeled using exponentials. In this section, we 
remedy this shortcoming. We then present a complete 
example which illustrates the usefulness of the model 
in analyzing air defense network performance. 
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Consider the following modification of the relaxed 
Petri net with generally distributed activity durations. 
Suppose that a subset of {x: tail(x) = s} has determin-
istic duration. Let this set of activities be denoted 
D = {di, d2 , ••• , dk}, where V(d,) =a;; V(~) if and 
only if i =a;;j. Let ho, 'Yi, ... , -yk) be a set of probability 
I ti-vectors for each i = 0, 1, ... , k, 
'Y,,Y = P[X(V(d,)) = Y] 
with 'Yo,0 = 1. At time V(d,), activity d, completes and 
is appended to the current state, so 
P[X(V(d,)) = y O d,] = 'Y1,Y• 
We can consider {X(t), V(d,) =a;; t =a;; V(d,+i)I as satis-
fying Properties 1-3 of Section 3, and having "jumps" 
at times V(di), V(dz), ... , V(dk)-
4.1. An Air Defense Example 
Refer back to Figures 6 and 7, the relaxed Petri net 
fragments corresponding to the situation displays in 
Figures 1-4. The arcs with starred tails represent ac-
tivities that begin at time zero. The durations of these 
activities are flight times from the beginning of the 
scenario to the penetration of the indicated emitter 
detection envelopes. We assume that the flight path 
of the aircraft is fixed, and the velocity of the aircraft 
is deterministic. Thus, each of these activities is of 
deterministic duration. By placing these envelope 
penetration times in increasing order, we get our jump 
times {V(di), V(dz), ... , V(dk)}. 
We evaluated the network described in Figures 
1-4, 6 and 7. The generic times of execution of each 
type of activity are given in Table I. 
After experimenting with some jamming plans com-
monly used by ECM planners, we created effects 2- 7 
described in Table II. 
The results of jammer asset allocations 2- 7 are 
shown in Figure 8 as boxplots of the time the aircraft 
is tracked by a target tracking radar. The x symbols 
represent the 0.025 and 0.925 quantiles of the distri-
bution represented. The box contains the interquantile 
range of the distribution, while the circle is centered 
Table I 











0.5 and 1.0 
0.1 
Table II 
Jamming Asset Allocations 
1. Baseline 
2. Slowing detections ofEW2 and CPTA2 by 100%, reduc-
ing corresponding detection ranges 50% 
3. Slowing detections of all EWs by 100%, reducing corre-
sponding detection ranges by 50% 
4. Force kTADF from I to 2 
5. Slowing communications to zone command node by 
1,000% 
6. Slowing all battalion level TA emitters by I 00% 
7. Remove TA DF capability 
8. Plan 7 plus slowing BAT2 TA by 150%, reducing its 
detection range by 50% 
9. Plan 8, plus forcing kERRPTCTRE from I to 2 
10. Plan 9 plus slowing BAT! HF by 150%, reducing its 
range by 50% 
11. Plan 10 plus slowing BATI TA by 150%, reducing its 




15 0 .. . .. 
" . .. 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 jQ 11 12 
treatment 
Figure 8. Box plots. 
on the median. The upshot of Figure 8 is that, accord-
ing to our model, none of the jammer asset allocations 
used in isolation provides a great deal of effectiveness. 
Thus, we experimented with combinations of jam-
ming tactics. To guide our search for good combina-
tions, we used the criticality indices for the different 
emitters in a steepest descentlike heuristic. Note that 
we do not propose using criticality indices to deter-
mine optimal descent directions in an optimization 
scheme for the following two reasons: 
• the decision variables are jam/no jam for each 
emitter, i.e., this is a discrete optimization problem; 
• criticality indices do not account for the role of kn 
for node n, and this parameter may be under the 
control of the ECM planner. 
Following the values of the criticality indices and our 
instincts, we developed jammer allocations 8-11 of 
.- .... : •• ,___,,, • .,,,,, •• ,M,, ••••• .., • .-.--,,·,wm,·,·-·,··w••hd,V•··-wwT=e&-pyrignf~J~rnr·R1ghts 'Reserved"""'''' ·==•='"m,•m,•~-•m,'"·'M·•·•·W,,•m,•,•·····w···-··m·'·~·-
Table II. The changes in criticality of the emitters 
and decision processes are shown in Figures 9-12. 
Figure 13 shows the density functions for the duration 
of time that the aircraft is locked on by a target 
tracking emitter for each allocation. As expected, the 
BATTALION 
• Ac.LOCATION l
8 A•-LOCATIO'v 7 
Ill AL.LOCAT!OI\/ B 
1z1 ALLOCATION 9 
0 ALLOCATION 10 • ALLOCATION l 1 
Figure 9. Target acquisition emitter criticality. 
BATTALION 
• ALLOCATION 1 
Bl A!..LOCATlO"/ 7 
II A!..LOCATlO"I B 
t;;;J A:..LOCATION 9 
0 A:..LOCATION 10 
• ALLOCATION 11 
Figure 10. Target finder emitter criticality. 
TT EMITTER 
• ALLOCAT:ON 1 
II ALUJCATION 7 
It AL ~OCA TIO!\ 8 
~ AL_OCATION 9 
0 ALLCCA ";ION 1 0 
• ALLOCATION 1 t 
Figure 11. Target tracker criticality. 
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tracking time decreases as we commit more jamming 
assets. 
From Figures 8 and 14, we witness an interesting 
phenomenon. Although we are able to reduce the 
critical values of the densities by adding jamming 
assets, the high percentiles do not decrease signifi-
cantly. Thus, an airwing commander of extremely 
conservative mindset might not see any benefit to 
jamming the radar systems as we have described. 
Contrastingly, Figure 14 shows the probability of es-
caping the threat area without being tracked at all. 
The first jammer asset allocations provide no response 
at all in this measure. However, the accumulated effect 
of the different jamming tactics in allocations 8-11 
shows dramatic increases in the probability of escaping 
without target tracker lock-on. 
E\1,1 =1PT CNTR TA DAT A FUSIO"J ZCN~ 
• A:..LOCA-IOr-• 
B A:..Lccr1oi-.; 7 
II A,_LCCA-lot\' a 
E:;l A~Lc::t..-lJ~ 9 
0 10 • II 









Figure 13. Probability density function for jammer 
allocations l and 7-11. Allocation l has 
the largest mode, while allocation 11 has 
the smallest. The mode of the density 
decreases as the allocation number 
increases. 
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Figure 14. The probability of escaping the threat area 
without being tracked at all. 
4.2. Sensitivity to the Assumption of Exponential 
Detection and Transmission Times 
Our assumption that detection and transmission times 
are independent, exponential random variables is 
somewhat restrictive. As we have argued, radar detec-
tion of an incoming strike group is plausibly mem-
oryless. The number of scans performed prior to 
detection is, in physical reality, a geometric random 
variable, a discrete memoryless random variable. 
Hence, because interscan times are minute compared 
to the scale of an air battle timeline, the continuous 
memoryless distribution, the exponential, is a reason-
able model. 
We argue that our theoretical development remains 
valid even when exponentiality is clearly not appro-
priate. Two results support this premise, one is asymp-
totic in nature, and the other involves recent 
developments in the approximation theory of proba-
bility distributions. 
Suppose that we have radars attempting to perform 
the same detection task. Each radar has detection time 
distribution F. Thus, the probability that the time 
required for the first detection is less than t > 0 is 
given by 
P[detection before t] = 1 - (1 - F(tW. 
But, as n gets large, or equivalently, as the threat 
environment becomes dense, we have 
1 - (1 - F(t)Y - 1 _ e-f(O)tln, 
as n gets large, wheref(0) is the value of the associated 
density of F evaluated at t = 0 (see Feller 1970). Thus, 
as the threat radar environment becomes dense the 
time until transition in the stochastic Petri net ~odel 
becomes approximately exponential regardless of the 
underlying distribution of the task times. Woodward 
( 1980) builds his description of information theory on 
the logarithmic message content contained in a small 
packet of data. Thus, sending messages of determin-
istic content should require an approximately expo-
nential amount of time. 
The second supporting argument involves the work 
of Johnson and Taaffe ( 1988a). It has been known for 
some time that any unimodal distribution having 
support on [0, oo] may be approximated by a phase-
type distribution (see Neuts 1981). More recent work 
by Johnson and Taaffe shows methods for performing 
this approximation for an arbitrary conforming distri-
bution function. Results presented by Johnson and 
Taaffe (1988b) show these approximations to be quite 
good in a majority of cases when the context is single 
server queues. 
It is apparent that, without any modifications to the 
theoretical development or the computational tech-
niques employed, the model described in Sections 3 
and 4 of this paper carries through using phase-type 
distributions. 
Because the calculations of criticality indices depend 
only on the transfusion probabilities of the processes 
embedded Markov chain, any generalization with 
an embedded Markov chain does not affect this part 
of our analysis. For example, one could generalize the 
system to the semi-Markov case, where transitions 
and sojourn time are not independent. In this case, 
the computation of criticality indices does not change. 
However, computing distributional results becomes 
very difficult in the semi-Markov model. The mo-
ments of the performance measure are accessible 
through the processes generating function. 
Finally, we consider some limited dependency cases. 
Kulkarni and Adlakha note that arcs emanating from 
the same node may be dependent, with exponential 
marginal distributions. They argue that the Markov 
process method of analysis applies to this case without 
modification. Since the mechanisms of transition of 
the stochastic relaxed Petri net we describe are so 
similar, we feel free to make the same extension 
without proof. Thus, we may span the spectrum of 
dependence with our model. Independent activity du-
rations are modeled in Section 4, and completely 
dependent durations are modeled using combinations 
of arcs with zero duration in the company of expo-
nentially long activities. 
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